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The transfer of patient information between the domains of community and hospital influences the quality,
continuity and cost of health care. To supply the need for information flow between community and hospital,
computerized Health Information Exchange (HIE) systems have evolved. This paper examines the institutional forces
that shape HIE development in Israel and in the United States.
In Israel, the vertically integrated Clalit health services developed a different solution for HIE than was developed in
the non-vertically integrated Maccabi and Meuhedet health funds. In the United States the fragmented nature of
providers – outside of specific networks such as parts of the Kaiser Permanente and Veterans Administration
system – have dictated a very different evolution of information flow between community and hospital. More
broadly, we consider how institutional factors shape (and will shape) the development of HIEs in different contexts.
This paper applies institutional analysis to explain the emergence of different patterns of development of HIE
systems in each of the environments. The institutional analysis in this paper can be used to anticipate the future
success or failure of incentives to promote digital information sharing at transition of care.
Keywords: Health Information Exchange (HIE), Regional Health Information Organization (RHIO), Computer assisted
communication, Transition of care, Information flow, Medical informatics, Community, Institutional analysisIntroduction
Information exchange needed between community and
hospital to improve care
Patients with chronic diseases and complex treatment
regimens are most at risk when transitioning between
hospital and community. Miscommunication or just lack
of information may trigger unwarranted and potentially
dangerous treatment [1,2]. Discharge from the hospital
to community carries significant risk for unintentional
medication discontinuation [3].
The paper discharge summary issued to patients when
leaving the hospital, like the paper referral letter from a
physician in the community, is an attempt to provide
information flow between the hospital and the community.
In general, traditional paper documents rely on patients to
pass on the documents to the community physician. In
practice, documents are often not passed on in a timely* Correspondence: Frankel@hadassah.org.il
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orfashion. Kripalani et al. showed that in 47% of cases, the
discharge letter took more than one week to reach the
primary care physician in the community [2].
The paper discharge summary suffers from additional
deficits. Test results that were not received at the time
when the discharge summary is produced will, often, never
be seen by the primary care physician in the community.
Kripalani et al. reported that at the date of discharge 88%
of patients had tests still waiting for results. In addition,
paper discharge summaries are not incorporated in the
primary care physician’s EMR (if he has one!) and will,
effectively, be lost for purposes of follow-up by the pri-
mary care physician. In addition, rich patient information
(such as the patient’s response to specific drugs) will be lost
to the record. This is further complicated by the growing
but still limited adoption rate of EMRs by office-based
physicians which in the US was only at 57% in 2011 [4].
The paper referral letter from a physician in the
community to the hospital is even more problematic.
In emergency cases, no letter at all will be available
and the admitting hospital will have no reliable record
of existing diagnoses, current medications, symptomsLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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letter is available, the referring physician typically focuses
on the immediate reason for referral. In many cases, the
referral letter will not include background information.
(If the referring physician uses an EMR, the paper
referral letter will often include a list of chronic diseases
and medications, but typically will not include recent
lab results or imaging, when those results are stored in
a different computer system.)
Digital information flows have been advocated to address
the limitations inherent in paper-based information
exchange [5]. In the United States, Regional Health
Information Organizations (RHIOs) emerged as an
infrastructure, evolving towards Health Information
Exchanges (HIEs), in response to the limitations inherent
in paper-based information exchange. In Israel, the
vertically integrated Clalit Health Services seeks to
completely open information exchange between hospital
and community care by providing a single medical in-
formatics system across the spectrum of care. In each
country, and within each country, institutional factors
have shaped and continue to shape the development of
health information exchange.
How institutional factors shape information flow
Often, problems that seem purely technical, such as data
flow through a health provider network, are addressed
by discrete technical fixes. Ideally, technical solutions to
technical challenges will factor in the institutional context
that will both influence and be influenced by the introduc-
tion of technical interventions. To place health information
exchanges in institutional context, we present some factors
to consider in planning, as well as simulating what is likely
to happen in the implementation process [6].
The arrangement of healthcare institutions in a society
or geographic unit will directly affect the factors that
influence the rate and cost of adopting health information
exchange between partners in a coalition. These factors
include the level of centralization of decision making in
the coalition, the starting point for electronic medical
records, the number/diversity of records systems that
need to be integrated into the exchange, and the scale
(how many records).
Despite seeming to be an obvious consideration, it is
often overlooked that introduction of Health Information
Technology (HIT), not to mention attempts at inter-
organizational transfer of data, will be impacted by the
status of such systems at the outset of policy intervention.
In organizations and health systems with strong histories
of HIT development and utilization, information transfer
issues will play out differently than in systems with nascent
HIT systems. On one hand, a tradition of information
technology at the individual provider – for example, health
plan or hospital – level can serve as an infrastructure whichfacilitates information transfer. On the other hand,
organizational level weddedness to existing systems, as
well as proprietary and political interests may block
smooth integration of systems across organizations.
Alternatively, systems seeking to introduce both new
information systems and guarantee transferability of
data may be biting off more than they can chew.
Rate and cost of HIE adoption is also a function of the
starting point: the level of computerization within each
of the partners and between the partners in a network
before foundation of the HIE. In a case where some
members of the network have no electronic medical
records, HIE implementation will be delayed until the
member organizations adopt computerized systems. In
Israel, the nature of affiliation between community
physicians and the Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) enabled the HMOs to require almost totally
electronic records for community care. In the United
States where the relationship between payers and providers
is much looser, in general, individual practices and hospitals
have been slower to adopt electronic records [7,8]. Related
to history, starting point, and level of computerization is
culture. In cultures where there is an overall push to tech-
nology and information systems, especially if physicians are
part and parcel of such a culture, implementation of HIT
will be enhanced. In such a culture, movement towards
health information exchange may be driven at the grass
roots as part of an overall societal orientation towards
computerization. Where cultural factors work against HIT
(for whatever reason, such as professional status or working
conditions of physicians, the size of physician practices [9],
or issues of privacy) and medical culture has been slow to
adopt information technology, policies directed at develop-
ment of health information exchanges and their integration
face cultural as well as technical challenges.
The institutional linkages among organizations will
also have an impact. All information exchange solutions
carry costs, startup implementation costs and ongoing
transaction costs. Transaction costs will be higher, and
rate of adoption will be slower, in loosely grouped coali-
tions of providers. An institutional arrangement where
one overarching framework is available to allocate funds
for paying costs and mandate implementation will move
faster than an institutional arrangement with many com-
pletely independent actors [10]. For example, the United
States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was an early
adopter of health information flow within their extensive
network thanks to highly centralized management.
HIE adoption costs will also be a function of the number
of local systems that need to be integrated. In Israel, each
of the HMOs has implemented standards-based records
for community care across the network of providers.
In the United States, individual practices who have
adopted a software system have chosen from a plethora
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and more difficult.
The scale of institutions affects the unit cost for
information exchange systems. In Israel, with relatively
large HMOs covering millions of subscribers, information
exchange systems within each HMO were adopted
relatively early and did not require government subsidies or
regulations. In the United States, with many independent
physicians and many small groups of physicians, the
unit cost has been prohibitive and – prior to the era of
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) – HIEs have
withered as soon as government or philanthropic subsidies
for the exchanges became exhausted.
Finally, the contingencies of national policy regarding
health information systems will influence the type of
systems that emerge, the incentives of individual orga-
nizations and players to cooperate, and the smoothness
of implementation.
In the remainder of this paper, we employ this insti-
tutional lens in a comparative context, discussing the
evolution of health information systems, in particular
attempts at information transfer, in the US and Israel.
The response to the need for information flow in the
United States
The state and prognosis of health information exchange
in the United States is a direct function of institutional
and other non-technical factors, including factors that
are unique to the American experience.
Developing standards to enable information flow
When different providers operate different medical record
software need to exchange data, ideally each software
system would adopt a single standard to enable interoper-
ability. In fact, multiple standards compete for the position
of “the” standard, such as the Health Level 7 (HL7) Clinical
Document Architecture (CDA) and The American Society
for Testing and Materials (ASTM International) Continuity
of Care Record (CCR) [11]. Even when a standard is
adopted, differing implementations of the standard pose
ongoing interoperability challenges [12].
Standards alone have not been sufficient to promote
widespread health information flow. Institutional factors
and economic incentives have been key players in those
cases where health information is shared between providers.
The development of regional health information
organizations (RHIOs)
Prior to 2010, the focus of the Nationwide Health
Information Network (NwHIN) [13] was on facilitating
Regional Health Information Organizations (RHIOs).
A RHIO seeks to provide health information exchange be-
tween health care stakeholders within a defined geographic
area. The goal was to improve care, but the broad regionalsweep of RHIOs did not factor in the inherent institutional
relationships between the providers.
The RHIOs had critical challenges, including compensat-
ing for the American resistance to using a unique identifier
for people and dealing with a fragmented health care deliv-
ery system, even within small geographical area (Table 1).
RHIOs, initially supported by grants, were supposed to
become self-supporting by charging fees to providers
and insurers. However, starting in 2010, before many
RHIOs became self-supporting, the Office of the National
Coordinator (ONC) has been sponsoring policies that
promote Health Information Exchanges (HIEs), rather than
RHIOs. Grant funding for RHIOs has largely ended, forcing
RHIOs to rely on fees from providers and insurers [14]. As
demonstrated by Adler-Milstein et al. [15], early depend-
ence on grants is associated with a lower probability that a
RHIO will be operational or financially viable.
In general, the RHIOs do not have a sustainable busi-
ness model and are probably not viable without ongoing
government funding. The geographical focus of RHIOs
carried no inherent business incentives for providers and
insurers. The costs of information exchange within an
RHIO are not tied to possible gains, because the mem-
bers in the organization do not share profits and losses.
With government support under the Bush administration,
the number of RHIOs expanded between 2005 and 2008
to over 100 active organizations. Even under this period,
however, achievements of the RHIOs were limited because
of inadequate funding. Under the Obama administration,
support for RHIOs has been reduced and RHIOs have
shrunk. By December 2009, only 75 RHIOs were oper-
ational with coverage of approximately 14% of U.S.
hospitals and only 3% of ambulatory practices. Of the
75 operational RHIOs, only 25 met criteria for financial
viability, only thirteen RHIOs supported stage 1 meaningful
use and none met an expert-derived definition of a compre-
hensive RHIO [16].
While RHIOs may be useful in improving information
flows between providers, and may improve patient care,
institutional factors were not aligned to provide viable
ongoing sustenance for RHIO. Essentially, RHIOs are on
artificial life support, connected to government or phil-
anthropic largesse and when the flow of support is cut
off, the RHIO shuts down.
The Indiana Network for Patient Care (INPC), a city-
wide clinical informatics network in Indianapolis, is an
excellent example of a RHIO that works, and illustrates
how the RHIO is dependent on external funding. The
INPC is substantially dependent on funding from the
Regenstrief Institute. (The Institute is named for Samuel
N. Regenstrief, an industrial production expert who
invented the low cost front-loading dishwasher.) Without
funding from the Regenstrief Institute, the INPC would
not be able to present information about patients as one
Table 1 Critical Tasks for RHIOs
Task Description Why needed
Identifying who’s who Sifting through different medical record numbers used by
different medical providers and health systems to determine
what records belong to a patient.
Resistance to using a unique universal identifier.
Melding disparate records
into a coherent picture
Combine medical records for a particular patient across
disparate providers and present an intelligible picture
for the clinician.
Health providers over spectrum of community and
hospital are fragmented without a common medical
record and without common data standards.
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The development of health information exchanges (HIEs)
In the United States, with the passage of the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health (HITECH) Act, enacted as part of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 under the Obama
administration, Health Information Exchanges (HIEs)
emerged as a response to the need for better information
flow. In particular, the HITECH Act allocates US$564
million for state-level health information exchanges [17].
HIEs facilitate the movement of actionable health care
information within or across organizations. HIEs owe
much in terms of computing standards and standardized
medical vocabulary to RHIOs, but HIEs have a different
business model and focus. Some HIEs, like RHIOs, are
state-sponsored, but HIEs can also be private profit or
not-for-profit organizations. The number of private HIEs
increased by more than three times over a fifteen month
period and now exceeds the number of public HIEs by 2.4
times [18] (Figure 1).
While RHIOs were typically focused on state or munici-
pal boundaries, privately-sponsored HIEs are likely to draw
patient data across population catchment areas and
will pay less attention to state or municipal boundaries.
(Like RHIOs, state-sponsored HIEs may tend to followFigure 1 Number of "Live" HIEs (data from: Sustainable Success: Statestate boundary lines. Private HIEs will follow coalitions of
providers under institutional umbrellas, such as an ACO).
The emergence of HIEs has been driven by push factors
(business need to get and keep referrals and government
incentives for meaningful use), has been enabled by the
emergence of lower cost distributed computing solutions,
and – like RHIOs – have been promoted by government
grants. The divergence of government grants from
RHIOs to HIEs effectively promotes HIEs in most areas
of the country.
As shown in Figure 1, the private sector has accelerated
adoption of HIEs, with the number of private HIEs increas-
ing by more than 200% over 15 months while public HIEs
increased by 80% during the same time period.
Referrals as a business driver for HIEs
HIEs carry the promise of improved care, but also provide
strong business incentives for adoption. The motivation
for adoption of HIEs by private operators is increasing/
maintaining patient volume. Providers who cooperate in
the HIE hope to increase referrals within the network of
partners in the HIE, driving patients to specialists, out-
patient facilities and hospitals in the HIE network [19].
For practice groups, and affiliate networks of hospitals
and physicians, keeping referrals within their networks is
a prime business goal. In the US, almost sixty percent of
patients seeking a specialist base their decision exclusivelyCIOs and Health Information Exchange) [18].
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a procedure choose the hospital based on a physician
recommendation or referral [20]. Whoever can share
referral information and follow up with primary care
physicians will win and keep referrals.
The shape of networks in different locations will drive
demand for record sharing via a HIE. A hospital that
owns a large network of community physicians and
requires all physicians to use the same EMR would have
less need for a HIE. But a similar hospital with fewer
community physicians on the same EMR would have a
greater need for a HIE.
As described in the Bay Area case study (next page),
the most important driver for major players adopting
the HIE was the ability to generate referrals.
Government incentives drive HIEs
HIEs, and the interoperability standards needed to support
HIEs, are promoted by Medicare and Medicaid health IT
incentives for healthcare organizations to achieve “mean-
ingful use” of EHRs. Between 2011 and 2015, American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) incentives
may total as much as $48,400 for eligible professionals and
up to $11 million for hospitals.
HIEs dependent on government incentives will always
be vulnerable to changes in government regulations.
Hospitals and community providers, aware of the fickle
nature of government incentives and rules, will be reluctant
to make the needed investments under conditions of
uncertainty. Should the prevailing attitudes among
policy makers shift – as was the case for RHIOs with
the shift to the Obama administration – the move to
HIEs will lose momentum, for those HIEs with insufficient
business incentives.
Government grants drive HIEs
In addition to business drivers and meaningful use
incentives, the Health Information Exchange Cooperative
Agreement Program alone has distributed nearly $550
million dollars in funding. As of March 2010, the number
of State HIE Cooperative Agreement Program awardees
totaled 56. (The number of awardees explains the jump
in the number of state-run HIEs between July 2010 and
September 2011, as shown in Figure 1.)
As noted in the Sustainable Success: State CIOs and
Health Information Exchange report, one of the conditions
for continuing awards is that the HIE can demonstrate that
it will generate enough revenue to cover all the costs for a
functioning HIE [18].
HIEs dependent on government grants will always be
vulnerable to changes in the availability of grants. Since
the HIE is, in some sense, a public good, it’s not clear at
all that state-run HIEs will develop viable sustainable
business models to keep HIEs running in the absence offederal largesse. The experience of RHIOs indicates that
making the move to a subscription fee or usage fee
model for HIEs will not be easy. The preponderance of
private HIEs is encouraging because private HIEs already
have an institutional framework for budgeting and
allocations. To the extent that the business case for
information exchange is compelling, the private HIE
can leverage their existing budget framework to support
ongoing operations without depending on marketing fee
for service programs to providers who participate in the
information exchange network.
Case study: the San Francisco Bay area HIE
The San Francisco Bay Area HIE covers more than
2,800 physicians and over 900,000 patients (Table 2).
An important motivator for one of the key players,
UCSF, was the lack of communications between refer-
ring physicians and staff physicians at UCSF. As noted
(see “Referral as a business Driver for HIEs” above),
medical centers such as UCSF are highly dependent on
physician referral. In fact, the first two features that
UCSF implemented were test result sharing and secure
messaging with patients and referring physicians. The
combination of these features enables UCSF physicians
to review results and discuss their findings with patients
and/or referring physicians [19]. In this case, for UCSF,
the need to maintain and expand the flow of referrals was
the critical motivating factor for HIE adoption.
ACOs will affect demand for information flow
An Accountable Care Organization (ACO) is a legal entity
composed of a network of doctors and hospitals that share
responsibility for providing care to patients. The ACO is a
provision of the Accountable Care Act intended to bring
down costs in the Medicare program (ACA section 3022).
Under current legislation, an ACO would agree to manage
all of the health care needs of a minimum of 5,000
Medicare beneficiaries for at least three years.
To win and keep customers, ACOs will need to prove
that the overall health care product they deliver works
better. To make profits, ACOs will need to be efficient
low-cost providers. Unlike traditional fee for service
Medicare payments, ACOs incentivize providers need to
reduce costs (Table 3). In this aspect, ACOs resemble
HMOs in Israel who receive capitation fees and have
strong incentives to use technology to reduce costs.
While physicians will likely want to refer patients to
hospitals and specialists within the ACO network, patients
will be free to see doctors of their choice outside the
network without paying more. Unlike in an HMO, an
ACO patient is not required to stay in the network. As a
result, physicians will need to balance patient satisfaction
with low-cost per patient. Use of an HIE to maintain
information flow across the provider spectrum within
Table 2 The players in the bay area HIE
Player Type Description
University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) Hospital 600-bed tertiary and quaternary regional referral medical
center. Averaged 740,000 ambulatory visits in 2008.
John Muir Health Hospital + Physician Network Not for profit. Includes two medical centers (581 beds),
a physicians network and outpatient clinics.
Hill Physicians Medical Group IPA Large IPA provides primary and specialized care to nearly
300,000 people.
Alta Bates Medical Group IPA 600-physician IPA. Serves 50,000 people.
San Ramon Regional Medical Center Hospital 123-bed acute care hospital.
Note: IPA, Independent Physicians Association; The Bay Area HIE is one of the HIEs in California.
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and low-cost operation [21].
To reduce costs over a multi-year period, ACOs
have to make up-front investments in improving care
(such as adding case managers) and in better coordinating
care between different providers in the community and
in hospitals. Care coordination requires two-way com-
munication between community and hospital providers.
For this reason, we anticipate that a shift to ACOs will
accelerate the movement towards HIE and will promote
improved information flow at the transition of care between
community and hospitals.
The advantage of large numbers of patients for
players in the ACO market will encourage growth of large
multispecialty physician groups and will encourage
hospital systems to buy up physician practices. The larger
the grouping, and the greater the vertical integration of the
providers from physicians in the community to hospitals,
the easier it becomes to provide a single Electronic
Health Record (EHR) with information that flows across
traditional boundaries.
How medication reconciliation programs will affect
information flow
Medication reconciliation programs are endorsed by the
Institute for Healthcare Improvement, are part of the
United States’ Joint Commission’s National Patient Safety
Goals, and are part of the “meaningful use” criteria under
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. As the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Process of
Care (Core) Measures move from a pay-for-reporting
structure to reimbursement based on performance
(value-based purchasing) [22], hospitals will seek means
for achieving medication reconciliation. Since it will not
be feasible to automatically get medication information
from the community, or to send medication informationTable 3 How ACO incentives influence providers
Fee for service under Medicare Incen
Fee-for-service payments. In general, doctors and
hospitals are paid more when they give patients
more tests and do more procedures.
Bonu
focus
Providfrom the hospital to the community, without use of
HIEs, incentives for medication reconciliation will drive
hospital demand for participation in HIEs.
The response to the need for information flow in
Israel
In Israel, universal national health insurance was legislated
in 1994. There are 4 HMOs: Clalit, Meuhedet, Maccabi
and Leumit. The HMOs are both the insurer and the pro-
vider of at least primary care in the community. The citizen
pays health taxes according to income, and can choose
freely between the HMOs without regard to their income
and without limitation based on their health status.
The HMO differ in structure (how primary care physi-
cians are compensated/employed), size (number of patients),
and scope. All of the HMOs offer networks of primary care
physicians, at least some secondary care, and operate labora-
tories. The HMOs operate at least basic radiology services
(X-ray, ultrasound) with supplementary imaging and
diagnostics provided by independent imaging centers
or imaging centers in hospitals. In some areas, HMOs
operate day-care units. Clalit is the only HMO to operate a
network of hospitals, including some of the most advanced
and largest hospitals in Israel. (Maccabi operates a profit
oriented hospital that does not provide emergency or
many other services.) Clalit makes use of other hospitals,
especially in areas where there is no Clalit hospital
(as in Jerusalem). The other HMOs direct their patients to
Clalit or non-Clalit hospitals based on location, specialty
and the financial arrangements that each HMO negotiates
with each hospital.
This situation where patients cross organizational
lines, with manual information flow between hospital
and community, leads to transition of care problems.
Patient medical records, traditionally, existed in a separate
silo for each HMO, with additional silos in specifictive payments for ACOs
ses when ACOs keep costs down and meet specific quality benchmarks,
ing on prevention and carefully managing patients with chronic diseases.
ers get paid more for keeping patients healthy and out of the hospital.
Frankel et al. Israel Journal of Health Policy Research 2013, 2:21 Page 7 of 11
http://www.ijhpr.org/content/2/1/21hospitals where the patient may have been hospitalized.
When a patient is admitted, the physician at the hospital
has to get the medical information from the patient himself
or from a referral letter (if available). Information flow stops
at institutional boundaries (Figure 2).
Unlike in the United States, in Israel virtually all
community care records are computerized in a single
system for each HMO. In addition, patient records in
Israeli hospitals are – for the most part – fully electronic.
Within the HMO, physicians – and patients – have
electronic access to a range of medical records including
lab results and imaging. In the United States, a move
towards Health Information Exchanges (HIEs) may first
require universal adoption of electronic medical records
in community care and in hospitals. In comparison, HIE
implementation in Israel starts from fully functioning
hospital systems and comprehensive in-place community
medical records.
Government and HMO influences on information
exchange evolution
In 2004 the Ministry of Health decided to establish a
country-wide HIE, the National Electronic Medical Registry
(NEMR). Using the proposed NEMR, any admitted hospital
could get critical information from other hospitals and
HMOs, including lists of chronic diseases, allergies and
chronic medications. The NEMR project has not come
to fruition yet and, to the best of our knowledge, has
been effectively stalled for approximately eight years. Even
should the NEMR move ahead, the NEMR as currently
envisioned would not provide full two-way information
flow. The NEMR would not address the need to share









Figure 2 Current State of Information Flow Hospital <->
Community (outside of the Clalit HMO).In the vacuum left by the absence of a top-down NEMR,
the HMOs and the hospitals established, separately, HIEs.
Initially, the HIEs were restricted to vertical integration
within a single provider. Gradually, the HIEs began to cross
institutional boundaries. The pioneer in cross-institution
medical record exchange was the OFEK system, established
by Clalit. Initially, OFEK bridged community and hospital
care within the Clalit network. The Ministry of Health wid-
ened the scope of exchange by funding connection of gov-
ernment owned facilities to OFEK. Later, Hadassah Medical
Center connected to the Maccabi and Meuhedet HIEs.
The case of the vertically integrated Clalit Health Services
The Clalit HMO has the full spectrum of health services
from primary care through tertiary medical. To improve
the information flow within the network of Clalit
community care and hospitals, in 2005 Clalit launched an
innovative system of hospital-community on-line medical
records called OFEK (a dbMotion software product).
Through the OFEK system, all Clalit clinics and hospitals
can communicate and get information on all the patients
in Clalit (Figure 3).
In addition to the Clalit hospitals, three government-
owned hospitals joined the OFEK system: Rambam, Sheba
and Wolfson. Rambam and Sheba are major tertiary care
centers. Currently, there is no connection between OFEK
and other non-Clalit HMOs. Nirel et al. found that
“at clinics in catchment areas of hospitals using OFEK
extensively, OFEK reduced the number of imaging tests
and, to a lesser extent, laboratory testing and improved
several quality measures” [23].
Unlike physicians in other HMOs, Clalit physicians















Figure 3 Information Flow Hospital <-> Community
within Clalit.
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When Clalit embarked on the OFEK project the other
HMOs led the field in sharing medical records across the
community. With OFEK, Clalit has been able to deliver a
single solution for both community and hospital records.
The vertical integration across hospital and community
care explains why Clalit has been a pioneer in sharing
electronic health information across the hospital-
community divide.
The case of Hadassah hospital and the HMOs: records
crossing borders
Hadassah Medical Center is a non-profit independent
organization which operates two hospitals in Jerusalem -
Hadassah Ein Kerem Hospital and Hadassah Mount
Scopus Hospital (1000 beds). Hadassah is a tertiary
medical center that serves patients from all over the
world but mainly from Jerusalem. All four HMOs direct
their patients to Hadassah as well as to other hospitals
in Jerusalem. In order to improve the connection
between Hadassah and the HMOs, Hadassah established
a computerized-connection between Hadassah and
two HMOs: Maccabi (2009) and Meuhedet (2011).
This connection enables hospital physicians to see
critical details from the patient’s electronic record in
the HMO (including chronic medications, lab results,
and imaging results) (Figure 4). For privacy reasons,
hospital physicians can only access information about the
patient while the patient is hospitalized in Hadassah.
This is a unique project, enabled by physicians and
medical informatics experts from the hospital and the














Figure 4 Information Flow Hospital <-> Community
at Hadassah.of the computerized connection is growing, with more
than 1,000 entries a month, especially after an “academic
detailing” intervention [24].
The HMOs have an incentive to invest in improved
information flow with Hadassah more than in hospitals
in other cities because of the absence of a Clalit hospital
in Jerusalem. However, the same competition for patients,
and the same potential gains from improved transition of
care for patients transitioning between hospitals and com-
munity, will drive the HMOs to seek similar arrangements
with other hospitals and in other cities. For Hadassah, the
desire to earn more referrals from community physicians
is an incentive to invest in the system, as well as a desire
to leverage information flow to provide the safest, most
optimal care. In addition, we attribute success to a fortuit-
ous combination of key personnel involved at Hadassah,
Maccabi and Meuhedet. Planning and implementation
were supported by strong lobbying on the part of staff
physicians, managers and the Hadassah Center for Clinical
Quality and Safety.Using institutional analysis to understand and recommend
The institutional analysis in this paper can be used to
explain and to anticipate the success or failure of digital
information sharing at transition of care, as well as
the course of developments in the evolution of health
information exchanges.Understanding past developments
In the US and Israel, the nature and direction of informa-
tion flow at the transition of care between hospital and
community can be understood in the context of the institu-
tional relationships between providers in the community,
and between hospital and community providers (Table 4).
Consistently, the presence and quality of computerized
information flow system between providers, especially
between hospital and community, is a function of the
tightness of the relationship between the providers.
In this context, at first glance the information flow
from Maccabi and Meuhedet to Hadassah seems some-
what of an outlier. In addition to improvements in the
quality of care, the incentives for Maccabi and Meuhedet
to invest in the system are the hoped for gains from
improved transition of care for patients transitioning
to one of the Hadassah hospitals. Leumit is not in-
volved, at least not yet, because its smaller size will
yield a smaller payoff. Hadassah’s incentive to invest is
to earn more referrals from community physicians
(the assumption is that improved information flow will
increase referrals). In addition, we attribute Hadassah’s
willingness to invest to strong lobbying by staff physi-
cians involved with the Hadassah Center for Clinical
Quality and Safety [25].
Table 4 Factors influencing information at the transition of care
Factor Influence on Information Flow
Fragmented relationships in the United States between
providers (outside of the VA, Kaiser and additional exceptions)
An extremely fragmented relationship between providers in much of the
United States has meant almost no electronic information flow within and
between primary, secondary and tertiary providers. When government agencies
provide carrots and sticks to encourage information flow, RHIOs and HIEs
emerge. When government funding is removed – as for the RHIOs –the
absence of coherent sets of providers/insurers with financial incentives to
make the exchanges work led, in most cases, to the closure of the exchanges.
Clalit HMO: a vertically integrated health service provider
across primary, secondary and tertiary care
A fully vertically integrated health service provider that covers the full spectrum
of needs for hospital and community, Clalit, has excellent information flow
between hospital and community.
Maccabi, Meuhedet and Leumit HMOs: integration in
primary and secondary care only
Health services providers that provide integrated community care – the Maccabi,
Meuhedet and Leumit HMOs in Israel – have excellent information flow between
providers in the community, but the information flow breaks down when
patients transition in or out of the hospital (with an important exception
for Maccabi, Meuhedet and Hadassah).
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Building on our institutional analysis we can anticipate
the success or failure of incentives, and can offer recom-
mendations to shape the evolution of digital information
sharing at transition of care in different environments.
For both Israel and the US, a key insight is that single-
minded focus on the technical and logistical challenges
of implementing Health Information Exchanges will
miss the important market structure, legal and cultural
contingencies that are as important. Moreover, a top-down
orientation, by which national government seeks to
promote deployment of HIT may not only run afoul of
local contingencies, but also miss out on the potential
of grass roots initiatives. Too often, it seems that well
intentioned pushes for using HIT to, for example, reduce
administrative costs, fail to give adequate attention to such
considerations (see, for example, Cutler et al. 2012) [26].
Regarding the United States, where fragmentation of
providers along the spectrum of care and separation
between providers and payers is the norm, we do not
expect information flow at transition of care between com-
munity and hospital environments to evolve organically.
While external incentives such as grants may stimulate
development of information exchanges, sustainability in
information exchanges beyond a grant period requires
structural changes that will increase the payoff from
sharing information. The single most important change
that we anticipate is change in reimbursement policy –
such as the ACOs – that provide payoffs sufficient for pro-
viders to cooperate in information flow. The question will
be whether ACOs can create the institutional conditions
for collaboration among erstwhile separate providers in
order to justify, from a cost point of view, the development
and maintenance of information exchanges. This is crucial,
as government and private grant support will be insufficient
to create long-term sustainable HIEs (Table 5).
In addition to government grants and incentives, private
sector funds (such as those provided by the RegenstriefInstitute) and insurance rules can trigger development and
promote adoption of solutions that facilitate information
flow at the transition of care. However, fragmentation of
providers means that solutions in the United States will be
more difficult to implement, more costly to develop, and
more expensive to maintain over time. The policy implica-
tion is that substantial ongoing incentives will be needed to
create and sustain HIE systems over time. ACOs are an
example of one instance where structural change provides
incentives to promote and support information exchange.
ACOs will, we anticipate, lead to development of sus-
tainable HIE, albeit within the confines of each ACO.
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) provides
an instructive example of how institutional factors can
support information flow. The integrated nature of the
VHA, the long term view that the VHA adopted, as well as
the VHA drive for quality, have all contributed to successful
health information exchange within the VHA.
In Israel, where community health records are fully
computerized for all four HMOs, it seems that computer-
ized information flow will evolve faster, more effectively
and relatively less expensively – at least in the near term –
than health information exchange in the US, where the
starting point for community records is less integrated. The
health services in Israel will continue to bridge the divide
separating hospital and community care, but in the future
will do so less by developing ad hoc solutions for each
HMO based on linking each HMO to medical records
in individual hospitals or hospital networks. Instead,
the divide separating hospital and community care will
be, increasingly, bridged by the expansion of OFEK to
other non-Clalit hospitals. OFEK will be used for all
HMOs to share information with hospitals. After OFEK
implantation becomes universal, there will be institutional
pressure to expand the functionality of OFEK. For example,
we expect the HMOs, including Clalit, to expand OFEK to
deliver alerts and warning for information from hospital
information to community care. If OFEK does not
Table 5 Forecasts and recommendations
Environment Forecasts Recommendation (to improve transition of care)
United States: HIEs • Changes in administration funding priorities that
reduce government support for HIEs could seriously
threaten the move to HIEs.
• Provide interim funding for successful HIEs
(in terms of volume of use) while making clear the
timelines for a shift to private financing.
• There will be a “shake out” as some HIEs discover
that they do not have a viable business model.
• Continue move to incentives for value-based
purchasing. This will encourage providers to invest
in development and support of solutions that
improve information flow at transition of care.
• Shift to ACOs will tend to accelerate growth of HIEs.
• Changes in reimbursement rules are likely to continue
the move towards vertical integration of providers
(hospitals acquiring group practices). Vertical integration
will facilitate improved information flow.
• Publish and support standards for coding
medical information to facilitate structured vertical
data sharing between different providers.
• Avoid the temptation to seek maximum data
sharing that is not focused on providing benefits to
ACOs. Seeking a maximal goal of totally free data flow
between providers could undercut the financial
incentives driving providers to join HIEs and share data.
• Eliminate incentives to not modify medication upon
discharge (avoid perverse effect of medication
reconciliation programs).
Israel: information flow at
hospital intake/discharge
• The non-Clalit health care providers will piggyback on
OFEK, extending the reach of OFEK to the other HMOs, to
government funded and other non-Clalit hospitals, and to
other rehabilitation centers and extended care facilities.
• Support easier information flow with promotion
of standardized vocabulary/guidelines between the
various HMOs and hospitals.
• The vertical integration of the HMOs provides strong
ongoing incentive for improving information flow at
hospital intake/discharge. We anticipate that information
flow will continue to improve, either through improvements
to OFEK or through development of new systems.
• Mandate information sharing.
• Mandate improvements over time, such as alarms
for test results received after the date of discharge.
Mandated improvements will drive future
enhancements to OFEK or other HIE systems.
• Clalit, by virtue of its ownership of hospitals, completing
the medical services supply chain, and by virtue of its size,
is likely to remain a dominant force in HIE and may continue
to set de facto standards and platforms for information flow.
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reemergence of various ad hoc hospital-by-hospital direct
information exchange between HMOs and individual hos-
pitals (similar to the arrangement already up and running
for Meuhedet and Maccabi with Hadassah).
Conclusion
In this institutional analysis we described the development
of RHIO and HIE systems in the United States and in
Israel. We detailed the multi-layered relationships be-
tween the health institution structure and the process
of development health information exchange between
different community and hospital health providers.
Worldwide, HIE development is key to improving
quality of care and containing costs. The very different
experiences of the United States and Israel provide lessons
that can be applied in different countries with very different
institutional arrangements for health care.
Before trying to develop or improve an HIE system in
any country, health policy authorities should consider
how local health institution structures will affect the
main players in the field. Understanding the whole
ecosystem of institutional relationships, incentives andinterests will aid decision makers in formulating policies
that will be effective for optimal HIE development and
implementation.
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